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Some assert that when efficiency requires  structure affects productivity in a sample of
cooperation, effectiveness is increased by an  Yugoslav firms. He finds that democratic
egalitarian pay structure resulting from warkers'  decisionmaking about pay - if divorced from
participation in decisionmaking about pay. But it  substantive participation of workers in other
can also be argued that equalizing pay reduces  areas - decreases productivity.
the morale of highly productive workers, and
thus more than offsets the positive effects of  One implication of this finding for policy-
cooperation.  makers, particularly in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet republics, is that programs de-
To shed light on this controversy, Vodopivec  signed to allow workers to participate in pay
explores both theoretically and empirically how  decisions must be consistent with the workers'
productivity is affected when workers determine  general involvement in decisionmaking. If
relative pay differences democratically (by  participation is limited to decisions about pay, or
referendum). The median voter model suggests  if external control is imposed on intrafirm wage
that this kind of decisionmaking process pro-  differentials (which has effects on wage distribu-
duces an egalitarian wage structure. Using  tion similar io those of worker participation), the
alternative assumptions about worker incentives,  resulting compressed wage structure is likely to
Vodopivec formalizes and empirically tests two  produce negative effects on productivity.
competing views about how an egalitarian wage
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REFERENCES  ........  24Part  of the  controversy  about  whether  workers  should  participate  in
decisionmaking  involves  the  question  of  whether  workers  should  participdie  in
decisionmaking  about  pay.I  Both theory  (median  voter  models)  and  evidence
(producer  cooperatives,  the  unionized  sector)  support  the  conclusion  that  when
workers  participate  in  pay decisions,  the  range  of  wages in  a firm narrows.2
Some assert  that "when  efficiency  requires  efficient  cooperation,  almost  any
movement  toward  a democratic  egalitarian  structure  increases  effectiveness"
(the  "cooperation"  argument).3  According  to this  argument,  more equal  pay
increases  cohesiveness,  which increases  productivity  by improving  the  flow and
use  of information  through  peer  pressure  (Levine  and  Tyson  1990)  and  by
reducing  "sabotage"  --  workers  hindering  the  activity  of their  co-workers
(Lazear  1989). But it  can  also  be argued  that  equalizing  pay  hurts the  morale
of  highly  productive  workers,  which  more than  offsets  the  positive  effects  of
cooperation  (the  lowering-of-morale  argument).
To shed light  on the  controversy,  this  paper  explores  both theoretically
and  empirically  how  productivity  is  affected  when  workers  determine  relative
pay  differences  democratically  (by  referendum). The  median  voter  model
suggests  that  such  a determination  produces  an egalitarian  wage structure.
Using  alternative  assumptions  about  worker  incentives,  I formalize  and
1There  is  a profound  controversy  about  the  effects  of  worker  participation  in
decisionmaking  on productivity. Advocates  of worker  participation  (notably,
Vanek  1970)  argue  that  it induces  workers  to  work harder  by boosting  team
spirit,  improving  morale,  and  reducing  absenteeism,  thus  reducing  costs  of
monitoring  and  conflict  resolution. Worker  participation  is  also  believed  to
improve  firm-specific  human  capital  by both increasing  Job longevity  and
enhancing  training  of workers  (Ireland  and  Law 1982). Among  critics,  Jensen
and  Meckling  (1979)  point  out a control  problem  and  Williamson  (1975)  point
out the  transaction  costs  arising  from  collective  decisionmaking.
2See,  for  example,  Freeman  and  Medoff  (1984)  on evidence  of how unions  affect
wage  equality.
3morton  Deutsch,  cited  in  Levine  and Tyson  (1990,  p. 211).
1empirically  test  two  competing  views  about  how  an egalitari  - wage  structure
affects  productivity,  in  a sample  of Yugoslav  firms. My major  finding:  that
democratic  decisionmaking  about  pay  --  if  divorced  from  substantive
participation  of workers  in other  areas  --  decreases  productivity.
After  formalizing  the  two  competlng  views  about  how  worker  participation
in  pay  decisions  affects  productivity,  and  deriving  their  empirical
implications  (section  1),  I  present  the  estimating  framework  and the  empirical
results  (section  2).  I  conclude  with the  discussion  of results  and their
implications  for  policy.
1.  MODELING  THE  EFFECTS  OF WORKER  PARTICIPATION  IN  PAY  DECISIONS
To test  how  worker  participation  in  pay  decisions  affects  productivity,  I
assume  that labor  input  (effective  labor)  depends  on the incentives  workers
face.4 I  derive  the  function  of effectively  provided  labor  under two
alternative  hypotheses  about  the  effects  of egalitarian  wage structure:  (1)
that  such  a wage structure  increases  cohesiveness  and  hence  productivity,  and
(2)  that  such  a wage structure  hurts  morale  and thus  decreases  the  effort  of
the  more  productive  workers,  and  hence  the  firms's  productivity  as a whole.
1.1  The cooperation  argument
This line  of reasoning  emphasizes  cooperation  as an important  feature  of
the  firm. It  assumes  two  things:  (1)  that  a narrower  wage dispersion  increases
cohesiveness  ("the  propensity  to obey  group  norms  because  the  approval  of the
group is  valued"  --  Levine  1991,  p. 237),  and (2)  that  greater  cohesiveness
increases  effective  labor,  and  hence  productivity.  Formally,  L =  L(C(D)),  witn
4This  is a standard  assumption  in the literature  on Incentives  --  for  example,
see  Sen's  pioneering  contribution  (1966).
2L'  (  )  positive  and  C'  (  )  negative  (L  is  effective  labor,  C is  cohesiveness,
and  D Is  wage dispersion). Note that  this  argument  implicitly  assumes  that  a
worker's  utility  depends  not only  on effort  (e)  and  earnings  (w)  --  the
standard  arguments  --  but  on the  approval  of co-workers,  that is,  U =  U[w,
e(C),  C].  Akerlof (1982)  used a similar  utility  function,  with  work norms
substituting  for  cohesiveness.
This  reasoning  predicts  that the  narrower  the  wage dispersion,  the
larger  the  provision  of effective  labor.
1.2  The lowering-of-morale  argument
By contrast,  the  second  line  of reasoning  emphasizes  individualistic
behavior  and  derives  the labor  supply  from  a standard  utility  maximization
over income  and leisure. It  explicitly  takes  account  of the  democratic
determination  of lntrafirm  relative  pay  differences,  and thus  endogenously
generates  wage structure. The  empirically  testable  prediction  is that
effective  labor  depends  negatively  on the  ratio  of the  firm's  mean to  median
earnings.
The  setting
Suppose  a firm  has N workers  who  differ  In productivity  but  are otherwise
identical. Following  Mueller's  (1976)  argument  (that  a significant  part of a
worker's  effort  is  non-contractual),  assume  also that  the  firm's  labor  input,
L, is the  sum  of contractual  labor  input,  Lc  ,  and  non-contractual  labor  input,
N  N
L  . Thus,  L  =L  + L  where  Lxe  n  L c  xe.  The  ability
-nc  c  nc  c  n
i=l  i=l
of worker  i  Is  denoted  by xl, the  provision  of the  minimum  effort  needed  to
5Recognizing  the  non-contractibility  of effort  as an essential  characteristic
of the  firm is particularly  important  for  socialist  firms,  for  which  "stick"
incentives  are Intentionally  designed  out  of the  system  (see  Vodopivec  1991).
3retain  a job is  ec,  and the  provision  of an above-minimum  effort  is  ei. (I
sometimes  call the  product  xiei the  productivity  of the  i-th  worker.)
Let the  firm's  value-added,  Y, correspond  to labor  input  except  for
N
the  unit  of measurement  --  that  Is,  Y =  Yc +  Ync,  where  Yc  =  Z  xiec
N  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~i=l N
and  Ync  =  xiei.  Moreover,  to reflect  the  compensation  policies  in
i=l
participatory  firms,  assume  that  the  pre-tax  earnings  of the  worker  1,  wi,
comprise  two  components:  (1)  an egalitarian,  lump-sum  component,  c, equal
across  workers,  and (2)  an income-sharing  component,  y-,  equal  to xiei (that
is,  equal  to the  worker's  productivity).6  Accordingly,
W=  c +  Yi =  c +  xiei  (1.1)
where
N
c  =  xie  (1.2) N  E  i  c(12
i=1
so that  the  overall  earnings  exhaust  the  firm's  value-added.
The  egalitarian  wage tendency  that  characterizes  the  democratic
wage-setting  environment  is  modeled  in the  following  way.7  The income-sharing
'This  mirrors  the  wage-setting  practiced  by Yugoslav  firms  in 1986:  c
corresponds  to the  earnings-in-kind  component,  and  xIeI  to the  cash-earnings
component  of a  worker's  compensatior.  Moreover,  a worker's  effort,  eI,  and
ability,  xI, correspond  to his/her  index  of the  quality  of work  and the
complexity  of work,  respectively  (see  appendix  1).
7There  is a well-documented  tendency  to  compress  differences  in  earnings  among
workers  within  the  Yugoslav  firm.  According  to  Prasnikar  and  Svejnar  (1988),
"[v]arious  measures  suggest  that  the  distribution  of personal  income  Is
relatively  egalitarian  in Yugoslav  firms,"  and "Yugoslav  skilled  workers  and
managers  earn less  relative  to  unskilled  workers  than  their  counterparts  in
4component  of the  worker's  pre-tax  earnings,  xiei,  is "taxed"  at the  rate t (O
s t < 1)  and used  for  financing  a lump-sum  subsidy,  r, for  each  worker.  The
subsidy  is  paid out  of the  tax  revenues,  and all  tax  revenues  ara
redistributed.  In  other  words,  r =  ty,  where  y (the  average  of the
income-sharing  component  of pre-tax  earnings)  equals  Ync  IN.  The redistribution
mechanism  is the  same  as for  a progressive  linear  income  tax.  The  net subsidy
per  worker  is equal  to t(y  - xJeI),  which  means  that the  net  subsidy  is
positive  for  workers  who  work below  the  mean level  of productivity  and
negative  for  workers  who  work above  it.  One  can  justify  such  a concept  on the
grounds  that  it captures  two  basic  features  of real-world  intrafirm
redistribution:  (1)  the  redistribution  is  from richer  to poorer  (and  so
compresses  the  structure  of personal  earnings),  and (2)  it  preserves  the  order
of personal  earnings.
Taking  account  of intrafirm  redistribution,  the  earnings  of the  worker
with  ability  xi are  equal  to:
Wi = wp + r - tx  e
=  r + c + (1-  t)xie 1 (2)
The  effects  of compressed  wage  differentials  on effective  labor  (value-added)
To model  the  effects  of compressed  wage  differentials  on productivity
within  a standard  utility  maximization  framework,  I  modify  the  median  voter
model  of Meltzer  and  Richard (1983),  which  employs  a Stone-Geary  utility
function:  8
capitalist  firms"  (p.  279).  Similarly,  Flakierski  (1989)  finds  that,  in
Yugoslavia,  "interskill  differentials  are  quite  small  by Western  standards  and
smaller  than  in many  socialist  countries"  (p.  75).
8Like  Meltzer  and  Richard,  I  assume  that  the  distribution  of income  is
positively  skewed.
su(w,  l)  =  in (w +  w) +  a ln(e  +  A);  a, w, A >  0  (3)
where e is  leisure,  and  w  and  A are the  parameters  of the  utility  function.
Each  worker  takes  the  parameters  r, t, and  c as given  and  chooses  ei to
maximize  his  utility.  Substituting  (2)  into (3),  maximizing  (3),  and setting  e
1-  e, yields
max u(wI,  1 - ei) =  max[ln(w + r + c + (1 - t)xiei)  + a ln(1 - e1 + A)].
ei
(4)
Differentiating  (4)  with respect  to ei we get
x  I(1  - t)a
w + r + c + (1 - t)x  IeI  1 - ei + A - (5)
and solving  for  e  we have
(1 + A)(1 - t)xi  - (w + r + c)a
ei  =  (a  + 1)(1 - t)xi  for x > x  (6.1)
ei =0  for  x s x  (6.2)
where  x  =  (w + r + c)a  (7)
o  (A + 1)(1 - t)
The ability  of the  most  productive  worker,  among  those  who  opt  not to
provide  more than the  minimum  effort,  e,  is  denoted  by x . I  call  this  worker
the i  -th  worker.
0
On the  basis  of the  supply-of-effort  functions  (6),  we can  obtain  the
following  comparative  statics  result: 9
Proposition  1:  Increasing  the  intrafirm  tax  rate t  has  a negative
9Proofs  of this  and  the  following  proposition  are  given  in  appendix  2.
6effect  on the  firm's  effectively  provided  labor  (value-added)  --  that  is,
decreases  the  size  of the  pie.
Unfortunately,  this intuitively  appealing  result  does  not lend  itself  to
empirical  verification:  the  intrafirm  tax  rate,  t, is unobservable,  By
exploiting  the  fact that  relative  earnings  (and  hence  the  tax  rate)  are
determined  by majority  rule,  however,  w  can link  the  tax  rate  to an
observable variable --  the task we turn to now.
Linking  ir.trafirm  redistribution  to  an observable  variable
The  modeling  of intrafirm  redistribution  as a simple  tax-subsidy  scheme
reduces  the  issue  of redistribution  to two  dimensions:  a per capita  subsidy,
r, and  an intrafirm  tax  rate,  t.  If  we require  that tax  revenues  equal  the
subsidies  paid  out,  we can  determine  only  one  of these  variables
independently. I  use the  tax  rate t  as the  choice  variable. Exploiting
democratic  wage  setting  (such  as prevailed  in  Yugoslav  firms  --  see  appendix
1),  we then invoke  a median  voter  theorem,  that  the  median  voter  decides.  10
Note the  balanced  budget,  r =  ty,  remember  the  budget  constraint
(2),  and  denote  the income-sharing  component  of the  median  worker's
pre-tax  earnings  with  Yd (yd  =  xded).  This  yields  the  following  maximization
for the  median  worker:
max  u(w  do1  e  - ed  max ln(w+ty+c+  (l-t)ydl  +aln(i-e+  A)]
(8)
The  first-order  condition  is:
y + t  dy  d  = O  (9)
'0For  a discussion  of the  median  voter  theorem,  see,  for  example,  Mueller
(1989).
7since  by the  envelope  theorem  the  coefficient  of the  ded/dt  term,  Su/Sedo  is
zero (ed  is  the  outcome  of utility  maximization).
To balance  the  budjet,  higher  taxes  are  needed  to increase  the  subsidy.
The  median  voter  thus  faces  the  following  trade-off  (embedded  in equation  9):
by imposing  a higher  tax  rate,  he/she  is  better  off through  the  higher  subsidy
r (which  is  proportional  to t).  But Jncreasing  the  tax  rate  has  also  an
indirect  effect:  decreasing  the  size  of the  pie, as stated  in  proposition  1,
which  makes the  median  voter  worse  off.
By using  the  equilibrium  condition  (9),  w- arrive  at the  following
relationship  (see  appendix  2), linking  the  tax  rate to  an observable  variable:
Proposition  2: The  higher  the  mean of the  income-sharing  component  of the
workers'  pre-tax  earnings,  compared  with the  income-sharing  component  of the
median  worker's  pre-tax  earnings,  the  higher  the  equilibrium  tax  rate, t.
This  proposition  can  be reinterpreted  as follows.  With the  intrafirm
redistribution  scheme  adopted  in the  model,  the  structure  of post-tax  earnings
corresponds  to the  structure  of pre-tax  earnings,  so it  also reflects  the
structure  of  workers'  productivity. The  proposition  thus  says  that  the lower
the  productivity  of the  median  worker,  compared  with the  firm's  mean
productivity,  the  more the  median  worker  can  gain  by imposing  a higher  tax
rate (or,  loosely  speaking,  a greater  redistribution  of income  within  the
firm).
Combining  propositions  1  and  2 produces  the  following  corollary.
Corollary  1:  The  higher  the  mean of the  income-sharing  component  of the
workers'  pre-tax  earnings,  compared  with the  income-sharing  component  of the
median  worker's  pre-tax  earnings,  the  lower  the  firm's  effectively  provided
8labor  (value-added).
Finally,  what was  the  policy  instrument  through  which  the  median  voter
implemerted  redistribution  in the  Yugoslav  firms?  It  was the  wage scale,
determined  by a referendum  of workers  under  majority  rule (see  appendix  1).
With the  optimal  intrafirm  tax  rate in  mind,  the  median  worker  set the  scale
so as to produce  the  desired  redistribution.  The  worker  accomplished  that  by
compressing  the  wage scale  --  shrinking  the  index  of work complexity  (Ic,  see
appendix  1) for  workers  whose  productivity  was above-average,  and increasing
the  index  for  workers  with  below-average  productivity.
2. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
To test  the  two  competing  hypotheses  about  the  effects  of worker
participation  in  pay decisions,  I  estimated  an  augmented  production  function
for  a sample  of Yugoslav  firms,  with the  augmenting  variables  that  determine
effective  labor  dictated  by the  above  theory. I  postulated  that  effective
labor  depends  not  only  on the  number  of workers,  but  also either  positively  on
wage  dispersion  (the  cooperation  argument)  or negatively  on the  ratio  of
the  firm's  mean to median  earnings  (the  lowered-morale  argument).  Note that
tThe resulting  post-redistribution  distribution  of cash earnings  was thus  D =
{eIxI  + (y  - xIeI)t  a  eIxIa, i=1,  ... ,  NE,  compared  with the  distribution
without  redistribution,  D =  ieIxI,  i  =  1, ... ,  N},  where iis  the
compression  coefficient  associated  with the  wage index  cf the  worker  with
ability  xl.  The  compression  coefficients,  cr-s,  are  defined  as  v1= I  +
- xe 1 ,  i  2,  ... ,  N (note  that  a, = 1 asy  -xe). e  x  <  <  Ii
In  the  empirical  test,  wage dispersion  is  normalized  by a dispersion  of
skills,  to control  for  differences  in skill  dispersion  across  firms.  I  also
take the  ratio  of the  mean to the  median  actual  (that  is,  after-tax)  personal
earnings  as a  proxy  for the  ratio  of  mean to median  income-sharing  component
9the  theory  provides  a rationale  for  using  the  augmented  variables  (wage
dispersion  and  the  ratio  of mean to  median  earnings)  in  a labor-embodied
iashion. By estimating  a production  function,  of course,  the  effects  of the
compressed  wage structure  on effectively  provided  labor  are identified  only
indirectly,  by how they  affect  value-added,  so other  determinants  of
value-added  are carefully  controlled  for.
In  general,  the  production  function  to  be estimated  can  be  written
as
Y =  f(K, L(N,  D, m, 2))g(Z)  (10)
where  Y is  value-added;  K is  capital;  L is  effectively  provided  labor,  N is
the  number  of workers;  D is  wage  dispersion  (normalized  by skills  dispersion),
m is the  ratio  of the  firm's  mean  to median  earnings;  and  ZI and  Z2  are
embodied  and  disembodied  control  variables,  respectively.
The choice  of the  functional  forms  for  the  functions  in (10)  was based  on
the  following  considerations.  First,  the  complexity  of the  term  representing
effectively  provided  labor  dictated  the  use  of the  simplest  functional  form
for  the  function  f( )  --  the  Cobb-Douglas  one.  Second,  the  functional  form
for the  effectively  provided  labor  was selected  on an experimental  basis,
choosing  between  the  form  where  the  number  of workers  interacted  with  other
variables  in a multiplicative  way,  and the  form  where that  interaction  was
additive. (The  first  form  was selected;  the  estimation  of the  second  did not
of pre-tax  earnings  (the  rationale  being  that  the  intrafirm  redistribution
scheme  preserves  the  correspondence  between  the  structure  of  pre-tax  and
after-tax  earnings).
13Prasnikar,  Svejnar  and  Klinedinst  (1992)  find  Cobb-Douglas  specifications  of
production  function  superior  to  CES and  trans-log  one  for  Yugoslav  firms
during  1975-9.
10converge.) Third,  as is standard  in the  literature,  an exponential  function
was adopted  for  disembodied  control  variables,  that  is,  for the  function  g( ).
As for the  choice  of the  control  variables,  the  following  two  were  used
in the  labor-embodied  fashion:  (1)  the  average  number  of  years  of education  of
the  workforce  (EDUC),  to  adjust  for  differences  in skills  acquired  through
education,  and (2)  labor  turnover  (TURN),  to  control  for  differences  in  skills
because  of "asset  specificity"  --  the longer  the  workers  stay in  the  firm,  the
more  firm-specific  knowledge  they  acquire,  and (other  things  being  equal)  the
more productive  they  become.
A more complex  version  of the  above  model  allows  for  another
interpretation  of the link  between  labor  turnover  and  value-added,  the
interpretation  based  on cooperation  among  workers.  Assuming  that  a  worker's
effort  depends  on his  co-workers's  effort,  one  can  show that  the  equilibrium
effort  of each  worker  is positively  associated  with the  "team  spirit"  --  more
precisely,  with the  sum  of changes  in co-workers'  effort  in  response  to  a
change  in  effort  of one  of them.  14  If  one is  willing  to interpret  labor
turnover  as a proxy  for  the  team  spirit  (presumably,  the  higher  the  team
spirit,  the  lower  the  turnover),  the  cooperative  link  between  labor  turnover
and  value-added  follows.
Two  groups  of disembodied  control  variables  were included  in the
equation. One group  consisted  of variables  that  affected  value-added  through
output  and input  prices:  (1)  the  firm's  market  share (MSHARE),  as proxy  for
monopoly  power; (2)  the  share  of exports  in the  firm's  output  (EXPSHARE),
reflecting  exchange  rate  pdticies;  and (3)  industry  dummies (DUM),  to control
14The  proof  of this  proposition  is available  to the  Interested  reader,  on
request.
11for  different  price  regimes  across  Industries  (which  might  have  affected  both
input  and  output  prices).  (The  positive  association  of the  export  share  with
value-added  could  also indicate  that  export-oriented  firms  were more
efficient.)
The  other  group  of disembodied  control  variables  addressed  efficiency  in
setting  the  "boundary  of the  firm" (in  the  sense  of Coase  1937)  --  that is,
efficiency  of production  organized  as a hierarchy  compared  with  production
coordinated  through  prices. Yugoslav  firms  differed  in organizational
structure  regarding  vertical  integration,  and these  differences  might  have
contributed  to differences  in their  performance.i Therefore,  two  additional
control  variables  were included  in the  estimated  equation:  the  unit's
membership  in  a so-called  Working  Organization  of Associated  Labor (WOAL)  and
its  membership  in a so-called  Composite  Organization  of Associated  Labor
(COAL).
Based  on the  above,  the  following  augmented  production  function  was
estimated  in its  logarithmic  transformation:
Y =  AK(N(l  + aID + a2m + a3EDUC + a4TURN))e
1=26
a  EXPSHARE  + a7WOAL  +  a8COAL  + Z  aDUM(
1=9
15Under  the  system  of Associated  Labor  that  prevailed  in  Yugoslavia  during
1974-88,  decisionmaking  within  the  firm involved  up to three  layers  of the
hierarchy. The lowest-level  units  were  Basic  Organizations  of Associated
Labor (BOALs). The  mid-level  units  were  Working  Organizations  of Associated
L*s.bor,  typically  consisting  of several  BOALs. Under  certain  circumstances,
hcwever,  Working  Organizations  of Associated  Labor  did  not  comprise  BOALs (the
so-called  Uniform  Working  Organizations);  in  those  units,  decisionmaking  was
not  delegated  to  a lower  level. Top-level  units  were Composite  Organizations
of Associated  Labor,  with  Working  Organizations  of Associated  Labor  as members
(membership  was  voluntary). See Prasnikar  and  Svejnar (1988)  for  details.
12(A,  a, 13  and  a  are  parameters  to  be estimated;  other  symbols  are explained
above). To repeat,  the  main  variables  are  wage dispersion  (D)  and the  ratio
of firm's  mean to  median  earnings  (m).
The  empirical  results  show  that  worker  participation  in  pay  decisions  has
a negative  effect  on productivity  (see  the  first  two  columns  --  representing
alternative  specifications  --  of table  1).  Above  all, the  ratio  of the
firm's  mean earnings  to its  median  personal  earnings  negatively  affects
value-added  (highly  significantly),  thus  supporting  the  lowering-of-morale
argument. Moreover,  the  positive  (though  only  weakly  significant)  value  of
the  coefficient  of  wage dispersion  not only  refutes  the  cohesiveness  argument
but  provides  additional  support  that  the  compression  of the  wage structure  is
counterproductive.
Estimates  of elasticities  suggest  that  the  economy  operates  at decreasing
returns  of scale (the  sum  of capital  and  effectively  provided  labor
elasticities  is .82),  which  is similar  to the  result  found  by Prasnikar,
Svejnar,  and  Klinedinst  (1992). Among  the  control  variables,  only  the  market
share (apart  from industry  dummies)  proved  to be significant  and of the
expected  positive  sign,  suggesting  that  monopoly  affects  prices. Other
variables  were insignificant  (except  for  education,  they  are  dropped  in  the
second  column),  but the  estimates  do suggest  a weak  positive  effect  from  skill
specificity  (through  the  variable  TURN)  and  a negative  effect  from the
existence  of a COAL-level  hierarchy  (possibly  through  restrictive  trade
practices).
16Nonlinear  estimation  was  used,  with capital  and the  number  of  workers
instrumented  by other  right-hand-side  variables  and lagged  values  of capital
and  number  of  workers.  Definitions  of the  variables,  their  summary  statistics,
and  data sources  are  given  in  appendix  3.
13TABLE  1
ESTIMATES  OF THE  AUGMENTED  PRODUCTION  FUNCTION
(1)  (2)  (3)
Wage dispersion  (D)  .151+  .119k  -.177
(1.84)  (1.78)  (-.67)
Mean-to-median earnings (m)  -.888  -.848  -.970
(-4.26)  (-5.10)  (-2.08)
Education  (EDUC)  .045  .028  .129
(.92)  (.85)  (.76)
Labor turnover (TURN)  -.019  -.036
(-1.53)  (-.88)
5  ~~~**  **  **
Market  share (10  2*MSHARE)  3.565  3.652  3.655
(4.47)  (4.55)  (4.17)
Export  share (102*EXPSHARE)  -.070  .160
(-.46)  (.71)
Membership  in  a WOAL (WOAL)  .037  -.063
(.61)  (-.90)
Membership  in  a COAL (COAL)  -.090  -. 094
(-1.61)  (-1.30)
Effective  labor (L)  .551  .554  .517
(7.72)  (7.80)  (6.06)
Capital  (K)  .273  .265  .298
(5.28)  (5.11)  (5.35)
INTERCEPT  3.817  3.968  3.641
(9.55)  (10.88)  (5.94)
R2  .849  .846  .906
Number  of observations  394  394  213
Notes:  Among  the  variables  in the  first  column  appears  also  L, the  effectively
provided  labor  --  the  expression  in  big  brackets  of (11),  with  f3  as the
corresponding  coefficient.  The  values  in  parentheses  are t-statistics.
Variables  significant  at 1  percent  are  marked  with two  asterisks,  those
significant  at 5 percent  with one  asterisk,  and those  at 10  percent
with  a plus. Industry  dummies  are included,  but their  coefficients  are
not reported  (the  excluded  industry  is  printing).  Only four  of them  --
drawn  and rolled  steel,  cast  metal  products,  paper  and  paper  products,
and the  manufacture  of cotton  fabrics  --  deviated  from  a common
intercept  at 1  percent  significance.
14These  results  suggest  that  worker  participation  in  pay  decisions,  in
general,  decreases  productivity. It is  possible  that  for  a subset  of firms  --
call them  "participatory"  firms  --  such  effects  may have  been less  pronounced.
One  attempt  to identify  such  firms is  to hypothesize  that  worker
decisionmaking  about  pay increases  cohesiveness  only if  workers  are  also
substantially  involved  in  other  areas  of decisionmaking  (the  "guaranteed
individual  rights"  argument  of Levine  and  Tyson  1990). By assuming  that
workers  in such  firms  spend  less  time  on sick leave  (so  we use sick leave  as a
proxy  for  absenteeism),  I identified  such  firms  as those  with  below-average
rates  of sick leave. The estimation  results  in the third  column  of table  1
refer  to this  group  of firms.  In  contrast  to the  estimates  for the  whole
sample,  the  wage dispersion  coefficient  is  negative  (though  insignificant),
thus  suggesting  that  cooperation  may  have indeed  played  a larger  role for this
subsample.
Calculations  show  that the  value-added  forgone  because  of the  negative
effects  on productivity  of an egalitarian  wage structure  amounts  to 4.34
percent.17  Compared  with  estimates  of welfare  loss  from  monopoly,  this  is a
significant  effect,  providing  support  to  Leibenstein's  (1966)  claim  that
X-inefficiency  losses  are  much larger  than  losses  arising  from  monopoly.  18
1  This  result  was obtained  from the  equation  (11),  by comparing  value-added
generated  under the  true  value  of the  mean-to-median  earnings  with the  value-
added  under  the  hypothetical  case  where  mean-to-median  earnings  takes  the
value  of one (in  that  case,  the  median  voter  model  suggests  that there  would
be no wage compression).  Calculations  were  performed  at the  sample  mean
(except  for  K, for  which  the  sample  mean  for log(K)  was  used; industry  dummies
were dropped).
1 "With few  exceptions,  studies  of the  U.S. economy  --  including  the  pioneering
Harberger's  (1954)  study  --  find  welfare  losses  attributable  to monopoly  of a
very low  magnitude  (about  0.1  percent  of GNP).
153. CONCLUDING  REMARKS
In  a recent  overview  of evidence  on the  effects  of worker  participation
in  decisionmaking  on productivity,  Levine  and  Tyson (1990)  cautiously  note
that  "tp]articipation  usually  has  a positive,  often  small,  effect  on
productivity,  sometimes  a zero  or statistically  insignificant  effect,  and
almost  never  a  negative  effect"  (p.  183). Literature  on organization
development  (for  example,  Lawler  1981)  also takes  an optimistic  view of the
effects  of worker  participation  in  pay  decisions. But researchers  agree  that
many  questions  still  await  an answer: For example,  is  successful
participation  representative  or direct? Consultative  or substantive? Formal
or informal? Does it  cover  a  wide range  of issues  (layoffs,  investment,  pay
system,  safety),  or focus  narrowly  on organization  of the  work and  quality
control? And,  most important,  do various  aspects  of participation  interact?
This  paper  provides  evidence  that  worker  decisionmaking  about  pay can
have a negative  impact  on productivity.  So what  went wrong  in the  Yugoslav
case?  Levine  and  Tyson (1990)  argue  that  the  recognition  that  workers  have  a
say In control  of the  firm is a basic  feature  that  explains  the  success  of
participatory  firms (p.  205).  One  plausible  interpretation  of this  paper's
empirical  results  --  corroborated  by the  above  result  on "participatory  firms"
--  is that in  Yugoslav  firms  some  essential  ingredients  of successful
participation  were  missing.  Indeed,  many agree  that  under  the  Yugoslav
self-management,  because  of extensive  government  intervention  in firms'
decisionmaking  and  because  of the  hierarchical  distribution  of power  within
firms,  workers  controlled  the  enterprise  on paper,  but  much less  so in
reality;  possibly  because  of detailed,  highly  formalized  procedures,
decisionmaking  about  the  relative  wage structure  was the  exception,  not the
16rule.  19  Workers'  direct  decisionmaking  was limited  to  a few  areas,  and
representative  participation  might  not  have allowed  for the  effective
participation  of most  workers.  20
One implication  of the  paper  for  policymakers,  particularly  in  Eastern
Europe  and the  ex-Soviet  republics,  is that  programs  designed  to allow  workers
to  participate  in  pay  decisions  must  give them  full  participation  in
decisiomaking. If  participation  is limited  to  decision  about  pay,  or if
external  control  is imposed  on intrafirm  wage  differentials  (having  similar
effects  on wage  distribution  as worker  participation),  the  resulting
compressed  wage structure  is likely  to  produce  negative  effects  on
productivity.  21
19On  the  workers'  lack  of substantive  control  of the  firm  workers  see
Obradovic  (1978),  Prasnikar  and  Svejnar  (1990),  and  Kraft  and  Vodopivec
(1992),  among  others.
20Tyson  and  Levine  (1990,  pp. 205-14)  identify  four  characteristics  of
successful  participatory  schemes:  profit-  or  gain-  sharing;  job  security  and
long-term  employment;  measures  to  build  group  cohesiveness  (under  which  they
emphasize  pay  equality);  and  guaranteed  individual  rights  (as  a means  to
achieve  a substantive  participation  in  decisionmaking).  While  job  security,
pay  equality,  and, to some  degree,  profit-sharing  can  be found  in  Yugoslav
firms,  the  absence  of independent  judicial  system  and independent  trade  unions
worked  against  the  fourth  above-mentioned  characteristic  --  guaranteed
individual  rights.
21In  Slovenia,  for example,  1991  legislation  limits  wage  differences  in  social
enterprises  to a 15-to-1  range. Even in the  U.S.A.,  there  has  been  a
suggestion  to  narrow  intrafirm  wage differences  administratively  (recently
congressman  Martin  0. Sabo  proposed  taxing  that  part  of managers'  salaries
that  exceeds  25 times  the  wages  of the  least  paid  worker  --  Business  Week,
March 30, 1992).
17APPENDIX 1:  HOW  WORKERS'  EARNINGS  WERE  DETERMINED  IN  YUGOSLAV  SELF-MANAGED
FIRMS
The  Law of Associated  Labor (LAL),  which  regulated  wage  determination  in
Yugoslav  firms  in 1986,  specified  that  workers  share  the  firm's  income,  and
that  their  earnings  consist  of two  components:  cash  earnings  and  earnings  in
kind (the  second,  typically  smaller,  component  included  such items  as
subsidized  housing  and  free  meals).  The  purpose  of the two-component
compensation  was to  distribute  firm income  according  to work (the  principle
used in  distributing  the  firm's  cash  earnings),  as well as on the  basis  of
"solidarity"  (the  principle  used in  distributing  the  firm's  collective
consumption fund --  LAL, Art. 126).
Workers'  cash  earnings  were determined  by both the  quality  and  quantity
of their  work.  22  The  quality  of work  was  evaluated  either  "objectively"  (by
work norms  and standards)  or "subjectively"  (by  a supervisor's  evaluation  of
an individual's  performance). The  quantity  of  work  was determined,  above  all,
by  the  complexity  of labor  provided,  which  was  calculated  on the  Marxian
concept  of "simple"  and "complex"  types  of labor.  23  An index  of complexity
(defined  as the  number  of units  of simple  labor  required  for  a unit of complex
labor)  was assigned  to  each job  in a firm,  thus  creating  a  wage scale  for the
firm.  24  (In  the  model,  ei corresponds  to the  quality,  and  xi to the  complexity
of labor.)
22See, for  example,  Schrenk (1981).
23Workers  typically  worked  the  same  number  of  hours  because  of rigid  employment
rules (Vodopivec  1991). This  made  duration  of work,  the  other  determinant  of
the  quantity  of work,  unimportant.
24Four  criteria  were taken  into  account:  the  worker's  capability,  the  amount  of
responsibility  involved,  the  physical  strain  required  of the  worker,  and
environmental  effects  on the  worker  (for  more  details,  see  Vodopivec  1989).
18Workers  determined  the  firm's  wage scale  by referendum  --  a feature  that
is central  to the  theoretical  model  constructed  above.  The  proposed  wage scale
was subject  to  a debate  in the  firm  and  was  voted  on by simple  majority  rule
(LAL,  Art. 463).  Evaluations  of quality  of work  among  workers  did not  vary  a
lot,  so the  wage scale  was the  most important  determinant  of  earnings  for  all
workers,  including  managers.
The  following  wage scale  of a Slovenian  manufacturing  firm shows  the
compression  of wage  differentials  in the  Yugoslav  firm in 1986 (for
example,  a plant  manager's  pay  was  only  3 times  the  pay  of a plastic-filer): 25
Description  of Work  Position  Degree  of
Complexity
1.  Simple  filing  off the  excess  plastic  from  1.00
finished  products
2.  Producing  of  metal  foil  cans  1.22
3.  Cutting  foil  1.25
4.  Running  the  printing  and  painting  machine  1.28
5.  Transporting  1.31
6.  Producing  intermediate  products  1.34
7.  Carrying  out less  demanding  installation  1.38
8.  Driving  electric  fork lift  1.42
9.  Administering  a warehouse  1.46
10.  Collecting  and  manipulating  data  1.52
11.  Simple  product  accounting  1.60
12.  Simple  metalwork  1.70
13.  Complicated  invoicing  1.83
14.  Demanding  metalwork  1.96
15.  Supervising  of a work  group  2.09
16.  Very  demanding  metalwork  2.24
17.  Supervising  a shift  2.38
18.  Preparing  and  controlling  technological  processes  2.53
19.  Buying  on foreign  markets  2.68
20.  Most demanding  product  design  2.83
21.  Managing  a bigger  plant  2.99
22.  Managing  a group  of designers  3.15
23.  Researching  and designing  construction  elements  3.34
24.  Managing  a production  division  3.54
25Wage range  in  Mondragon  cooperatives  has been  similar  to the  range  presented
here.  Bradley  and  Gelb (1985)  report  a range  of 1:4.5  (after  including
special  bonuses),  significantly  below  the  range  outside  the  cooperatives.
19Description  of  Work Position  Degree  of
Complexity
25.  Managing  a division  3.75
26.  Managing  a Basic  Organization  of Associated  Labor  3.95
27.  Managing  a Working  Organization  of Associated  Labor  4.54
Technically,  earnings  in  self-managed  Yugoslav  firms  were  determined  in
the  following  way.  First,  the  performance  score  of the i-th  worker  (T  )  was
obtained  as
T  =  Icx IQx  H
where I  is the  index  of the  complexity  of labor  of the  i-th  worker  as
determined  by the  job  scale,  IQ  is the index  of the  quality  of labor  of the
i-th  worker,  and  H  is the  number  of  hours  worked  by the i-th  worker.  Second,
the i-th  worker's  cash  earnings  (W  )  were  obtained  as
T
W  =  x  WBILL'
where  WBILL  is a the  firm's  fund  earmarked  for  cash  earnings,  and  the
i-th  worker's  share  in It.
APPENDIX  2: PROOFS  OF PROPOSITIONS
Proof  of Proposition  1
i
Let us denote F(x )  =  N- as the share of workers who do not provide
a  N
non-contractual  contributions  of effort  and information.  Note that  0 s  F( )  <
1 (in  a non-trivial  case  when  at least  some  of the  workers  are contributing
non-contractual  effort). Modifying  the  result  from  Meltzer  and  Richard  (1983,
p. 408))  --  the  budget  constraint  in the  model  above  includes  an additional
20lump-sum  term,  c --  we have
dy  a(1  - -F)(y + c + W)  (Al)
dt  (I  - t)l  + a)(1 - t) +  a(l  - F)tM
This  expression  is  negative  because  all  of the  multipliers  of the  ratio
on the  right-hand  side  are  positive.  QED
Proof  of Proposition  2
Meltzer  and  Richard (1983,  p. 409) show  that  the tax  rate,  t, can  be
approximated  by
t - (1  + a) (m  - 1)  (A2)
a(l - F) (l ..  g)
where  m =  , and  g = w  >  (Y  =xe,where  subscript  d refers  to the
Yd  d~~~~  d
decisive  worker).  The latter  term  takes  account  of the  modified  budget
constraint.  We want to  show that  dt >  0.
de  dt
Let  us first  show that  dt  s 0. For  xi s  x  ,  it  follows  from (6.2)  that
de  d 
=  0.  For  x1 >  x  , total  differentiation  of (6.1)  gives
de  d  (1  + A)(1  - t)x 1 - (w  + ty +  c)a
dtr  -dat  (a  +  1)(1  - t)x  J
a(y  + tdtY)  - t) + a(w  + c + ty)  a(fy  + t(1  - t  dt +  +C)
(1  +  a)x  I(1 - t) 2 (1  +  a)x  I(1 - t)2
Substituting  (Al)  in the  above  expression,
a(l1-F(y  +  c+  )
de  a(y  + w  + c - t(1  - t) (1  - t)[(1  +  a)(1  - t) +  a(1  - F)tt)
dt  (1  +  a)x  (I  t)(
(1 +  a)(1 - t) +  a(i - F)t - a(1  F)t  -
(1  +  a)(1  - t) +  a(i  - F)t  a(y +  c +  w)
(1  +  a)x  (1  - t) 2
21(1  +  a)(1  - t)a(  c+  )
(1  +  a)(1 - t) + a(l  - F)t  a(y  + c + w)
(1  + a)x(1  t
a(y +  c +  w)<  tA
(1  - t)H(1  +  a)(1  - t) + a(1  - F)t]x.  °  0A3)
I
The  final  expression  for  de  I/dt  is  negative  because  all  the  terms  of  the  ratio
are  positive.
Let  us  show  now  that  dd  > 0. The  logarithmic  derivation  of (A2)  gives
1  1  dm  +  1  dF  1  dg  (A4)
t  m  - 1  dt  1  - F  dt  1  +g dt
Further  manipulations  and  substitution  for  g yield
t  dm  1  t  dF +  t  _L w +  cl
m - 1  dt-  1  - F dt  I  +  g dt[  xde-J
1+ d  ln(F  -1)  +  t(w  +c)  d'  (A4)
+d  dln t  +(1  +  g)xe  dt 
d  d
Note  that  the  coefficient  of  d m  1 is  positive  (in  the  non-trivial
case  of  t  > 0,  m  >  1).  By (A3),  the  provision  of  non-contractual  effort
decreases  as  the  tax  rate  increases,  so  F,  the  proportion  of  workers  who  do
not  make  non-contractual  contributions,  increases  with  the  tax  rate,  t.  Thus,
the  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  of (A4)  Is  positive,  and  so  Is  the  last
de
term,  since  dtd  is  negative  by (A3).  QED
APPENDIX  3:  DATA  AND  VARIABLES  USED  IN  THE  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  the  sample  of  403  Slovenian
manufacturing  firms,  for  1986. To  allow  for  Industry-level  analysis,  only
industries  (defined  at  the  lowest,  5-digit  level)  with  10  or  more  firms  were
22included  in  the  sample,  together  accounting  for  approximately  10  percent  of
Slovenian  Gross  Material  Product. 26
The  average  firm in the  sample  employs  about  250  workers,  and  has  a
market  share  of 4  percent (see  table  Al) --  so the  firms  are large  from the
viewpoint  of market  economies,  and  small  from the  viewpoint  of other  Eastern
European  and  Soviet  economies. The  average  capital-output  ratio  of the  sample
is  a rather  low  0.84.  Most firms (83  percent  of them)  are  Basic  Organizations
of Associated  Labor;  the  rest  are  Uniform  Working  Organizations. Forty-five
percent  of them  are  members  of Composite  Organizations  of Associated  Labor.
The  variables  used in the  empirical  analysis  are  defined  as follows:
Y --  net value-added  of the  firm (revenues  minus  costs,  with costs  including
depreciation  but  not  wages),  in  millions  of 1986  dinars.
K --  capital  (current  value  of fixed  assets  in  use  at the  end  of the  year),  in
millions  of 1986  dinars.
N --  number  of workers  (yearly  average  of the  end-of-the-month  number  of
workers).
D --  dispersion  of  wages (the  coefficient  of variation  of wages  divided  by the
coefficient  of variation  of the  average  duration  of the  professional
education  of workers,  times  one  hundred).
m - the  ratio  of the  mean to  median  personal  earnings  of the  firm (computed
from the  data  on the  number  of  workers  falling  in 14  personal
earnings  brackets  as of March  1986).
EDUC  --  average  number  of years  of education  of the  workforce  (in  years).
TURN  --  labor  turnover  (the  sum  of separations  and  hirings  as a percentage  of
the total  number  of  workers  of the  firm,  as of  March 1986).
MSHARE  --  firm's  market  share  (the  firm's  revenues  as a percentage  of the
industry's  total  revenues  in Slovenia  in 1985).  (Because  of
non-tariff  barriers  to inter-republican  trade  were introduced  in the
1970s  and 1980s  in  Yugoslavia,  I  assumed  that the  relevant  market  was
the  republic.)
EXPSHARE  --  the  share  of exports  as a percentage  of the  firm's  revenues.
WOAL --  membership in a Working Organization of Associated Labor : 1 --  yes,
0 --  no (WOAL).
26The  following  19 industries  qualified:  drawn  and  rolled  steel;  cast  metal
products;  brick  production;  building  materials;  sawmilling;  board
manufacturing;  furniture;  paper  and  paper  products;  cotton  fabrics;  wool
fabrics;  knitwear;  underwear;  garment;  footwear;  bread  and  pastry;  vegetable
and  fruit  processing;  slaughtering;  wine production;  and  printing. The  data
were obtained  from  Slovenia's  Public  Accounting  Service  and  Statistical
Office.
23COAL --  membership in a Composite Organization of Associated Labor: 1 --  yes,
0 --  no (COAL).
DUM --  Industry  dummies.
Statistics  on the  above  variables  are summarized  in table  Al.
Table  Al:  SUMMARY  STATISTICS
Variable  Mean  Coefficient  of Variation
(in  percent)
Net  value-added  (Y)  1028.78  119.78
Capital  (K)  867.49  151.60
Number  of workers (N)  247.12  92.06
Dispersion  of wages (D)  25.13  24.66
Mean-to-median  earnings  (m)  1.05  5.54
Education  (EDUC)  9.04  11.39
Labor  turnover  (TURN)  2.51  111.30
Market  share (MSHARE)  4.03  112.22
Export  share (EXPSHARE)  15.04  109.71
Membership  in  a WOAL (WOAL)  .83  45.78
Membership  in  a COAL (COAL)  .45  111.00
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